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Abstract 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, a study has been conducted among students of 
economics in the United States regarding their propensity for cooperation, philan-
thropy and keeping promises. Regardless of the methods used, the research results 
have shown lower readiness for cooperation among students of economics in 
comparison to students of other disciplines. Moreover, the results are even worse 
after completing a microeconomics course. Based on these findings, two hypothe-
ses have been formulated: the auto-selection hypothesis and the indoctrination 
hypothesis. 
The aim of the paper is to formulate implications regarding the indoctrination 
hypothesis. A massive attendance at economic studies in Poland is an argument 
against the auto-selection hypothesis. However, unless the research is completed, 
this hypothesis cannot be rejected. The indoctrination hypothesis is more attractive 
due to the special cognitive and moral condition of post-communist society which 
economic studies lecturers are members of and due to the economic situation of 
higher education institutions. These circumstances which accompany the studying 
of economics in Poland favour, firstly, the introduction of highly specialised cur-
ricula which do not prepare students for understanding economic activity 
as a means for good life. Secondly, economic knowledge is interpreted by lectur-
ers as a set of instructions to manipulate market players. Thirdly, lecturers’ atti-
tudes and activities reflecting the principle that what is not legally prohibited is 
allowed are “awarded” with a higher financial status. 
 
                                                          
* The article is an updated version of the paper published in Polish in the Annales. Ethics in Economic 
Life, 8(2), 11–24. 
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These implications will be made probable by the analysis of the curricula and 
content of lectures in economic schools. Attention will be mostly focused on mi-
croeconomics; the main “defendant” accused of indoctrination in the American 
studies. 
Keywords: morality level, experimental research of students’ morality level, 
impact of microeconomic curricula on students’ morality level 
JEL Classification: A20 
1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, research has been carried out among students of 
economics in the United States concerning their propensity for cooperation and 
philanthropy, as well as their knowledge of basic moral concepts such as justice, 
fairness and honesty. Regardless of the methods applied, the results obtained indi-
cate lower readiness for cooperation among students of economics compared to 
students of non-economic disciplines and show the deterioration of the results 
after taking a microeconomics course. On this basis, two hypotheses have been 
formulated: the auto-selection hypothesis and the indoctrination hypothesis. 
The aim of the paper is to discuss the indoctrination hypothesis on the basis 
of the conducted research that comprised experimental games in which students 
participated. Knowledge of economic games and experimental conditions can shed 
some light on the results of the study carried out. The research results themselves 
are not as relevant as the question concerning the possibility of indoctrination by 
means of the content of economic sciences taught and by showing the image of 
selfish homo economicus. The sources of indoctrination in economic studies may 
be textbooks and other didactic materials as well as the person of the lecturer (the 
lecturer’s knowledge, views and teaching skills). Therefore, it is advisable to ex-
amine the content of textbooks on economics, especially in the area of microeco-
nomics, in which the motivations and characteristics of homo economicus are 
discussed due to the possibility of indoctrination consisting in promoting selfish 
attitudes and actions. The content of these textbooks will be analysed in the con-
text of discussions and doubts concerning the object of economics, its methods of 
analysis and status of a positive science. 
The first part of the paper will discuss experiments conducted among Ameri-
can students: the properties of selected games and their use in economics studies 
as well as their results in the light of controversy about the use of experiments in 
economics. The second part of the paper is devoted to the discussion of the con-
tent of economics textbooks in terms of: definitions and characteristics of econom-
ics, its methods of analysis, as well as the place of psychological and philosophi-
cal assumptions regarding homo economicus and the presentation of the consumer 
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choice theory. Basic textbooks used most often for teaching economics and micro-
economics in the United States will be the subject of the analysis conducted. The 
choice of textbooks written by American authors stems from several reasons. First 
of all, the study on economics students’ propensity for cooperation and honesty 
has been carried out at American universities. Secondly, the United States of 
America became the centre of development of mainstream economics in the 20
th
 
century. Thirdly, the template for teaching economics has been developed there. In 
the third part of the paper, the content of textbooks will be critically analysed in 
terms of completeness of economic knowledge and discursiveness of its message. 
In the conclusions, the implications of the hypothesis about indoctrination in 
teaching economics in Poland will be formulated. 
2. Research on the impact of economic studies on students’ 
morality level 
In the United States, several studies have been inspired by an experiment conduct-
ed in 1981 at the University of Wisconsin (Marwell & Ames, 1981). It concerned 
the problem of the free rider. In standard economics, there exists a strong hypothe-
sis concerning the avoidance of cooperation related to the public good. It is as-
sumed that people focused on their self-interest make a rational calculation of 
benefits and costs derived from cooperation which results in the public good. If 
coercion or other incentives to co-create the public good are not used, rational 
egoists will avoid cooperation, expecting benefits from the public good at zero 
private cost (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965). Marwell and Ames created such a situa-
tion and examined how students of different disciplines made the allocation 
of private resources between the private and public use. The return on funds for 
the private purpose was doubled (dollar for dollar). The return on funds for the 
public purpose was greater, and then it was evenly distributed among the experi-
ment participants. In eleven groups of non-economic students, the results were 
similar: approx. 49% of the resources were allocated to the public purpose. How-
ever, in the twelfth group, consisting of first-year students of economics, only 
about 20% of resources were allocated to the public purpose. On the subject of 
fairness, 
more than one-third of the economists refused to answer the question regarding 
what is fair, or gave very complex, uncodable responses. It seems that the mean-
ing of “fairness” in this context was somewhat alien to this group. Those who 
did respond were much more likely to say that little or no contribution was 
“fair”. In addition, the economics graduate students were about half as likely as 
other subjects to indicate that they were “concerned with fairness” in making 
their investment decision. (Marwell & Ames, 1981) 
The assessment of the value of these results requires consideration of various 
experiments regarding the free-rider hypothesis. Early experiments of Brubaker 
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(1975) have pointed to the importance of the conditions under which public action 
is taken. He has formulated a weak hypothesis about the free-rider according to 
which the refusal to cooperate is not motivated by selfishness and greed, but by 
the fear of losing private resources. This hypothesis is confirmed by the research 
of Dawes from 1986 (Dawes, van de Kragt & Orbell, 1990) and Samuelson et al. 
also from 1986, who studied free-riding as an effect of inefficient management of 
shared resources. Subsequent works of Ostrom (1990) and other economists from 
the institutional group confirm the importance of effective institutions in undertak-
ing cooperation. 
The experiment of Marwell and Ames was carried out at an early stage of re-
search on free-riding in which a strong hypothesis prevailed concerning the influ-
ence of selfish calculation oriented towards a private objective on the decision on 
cooperation. Graduate-level economics students could know the hypothesis and its 
implications regarding the destructive impact of collective actions on markets, 
allocation efficiency and economic growth. In artificial conditions in which social 
norms and information about decisions of other participants were not taken into 
account, economics students used their free-riding knowledge strategically, unlike 
in real social life. It can be argued that the Marwell and Ames experiment does not 
prove students’ different motivations but instead testifies to a different level of 
knowledge about free-riding. 
An attempt to investigate the selfish motivation of economics students was 
made by Carter and Irons (1991) by means of the experimental “ultimatum” game 
used by Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarz in 1982. Two people participate in the 
game: the proposer of the allocation of a certain resource between the said propos-
er and the other person (the responder) who can accept or reject it. In the latter 
case, none of the participants receive anything. This game is used to study caus-
es of conflict. It presents a potential conflict between the interests of the game 
participants. It is very simple, which allows one to study the motives guiding 
the participants of the game. In particular, the importance of reciprocity motiva-
tion can be studied. The standard economic theory, assuming common knowledge 
about rational egoism of the game participants, predicts that the offer will be close 
to zero and will not be rejected. In the Carter and Irons (1991) experiment, the 
offers of economics students amounted to an average of $3.95 for $10, while of-
fers from students of other disciplines to $4.56. The smallest amount accepted by 
economics students was $1.70, while in the case of students of other disciplines it 
was $2.44. The results of this experiment do not differ significantly from numer-
ous subsequent studies (Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003) conducted among differ-
ent populations. Most often, offers a range between 0.4 and 0.5 of the total amount 
to be divided. Very rarely, there are offers below 0.2. The most probable reason 
for this phenomenon is the fear of rejection of a lower offer. An offer ranging 
from 0.4 to 0.5 of the amount to be divided expresses, therefore, risk aversion and 
preferences for the reciprocity principle. A slightly lower offer of economics stu-
dents does not necessarily prove their egoism, but rather a higher propensity for 
risk and a lack of ability to apply the reciprocity principle in the market and in 
enterprises. 
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In the third experiment carried out by Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993), the 
game called the prisoner’s dilemma was used during the period when many of its 
various applications were already known. The authors of the experiment devel-
oped three versions of the game: 
(1) a one-off game between two people who did not know each other and 
could not know their decisions in subsequent games. The participants of the 
game received a payment, 
(2) a one-off game between two people who before the game, in a separate 
room, filled out a declaration about their decision in relation to each of the 
two other players in the group. Then the expenditures were calculated 
as the sum of: the results of the game with the first partner, and the results 
of the game with the second partner, providing a value drawn from a list of 
“positive and negative values”. The players only learned the sum without 
its components. The aim of this solution was to prevent the game partici-
pants from deducing their partner’s decision based on payoffs. This game 
had two variants: 
(2a) the participants could promise to cooperate, but specific decisions 
were not disclosed, 
(2b) the participants could learn their preferences by communicating for 30 
minutes or for 10 minutes. 
The results of the games are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. The results of “prisoner’s dilemma” game in the student experiment 
 Game 1  Game 2a  Game 2b 
C R  C R  C R 
Economics students 39.6% 60.4%  71.4% 28.6%  28.2% 71.8% 
Students of other disciplines 61.2% 38.8%  74.1% 25.9%  71.8% 47.3% 
Note. C = cooperation, R = refusal to cooperate.  Adapted from “Does studying economics inhibit cooperation?” by 
R.H. Frank, T. Gilovitch, D.T. Regan, 1993, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(2), 159-177. 
The results of these games are not surprising. Games played in artificial con-
ditions in which participants cannot get to know each other and are not familiar 
with their mutual preferences in terms of values and motives for action do not 
provide grounds for generalisations. In addition, monetary payments are condu-
cive to making selfish decisions,
1
 as there are no other incentives that determine or 
reduce payoffs such as satisfaction or shame. Other studies indicate that the ability 
to communicate and learn about the past of the game participants significantly 
limits selfish choices (Axelrod, 1984; Gilbert, 1996; Poundstone, 1992), as con-
firmed by the presented research. Therefore, only the result indicating the impact 
of economic education on the refusal to cooperate is of value. However, it should 
be taken into account that the awareness that it was an experiment that would not 
                                                          
1 Sulejewicz does not mention any monetary payments in his paper (2002). 
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cause any real harm might have been used to play a game with the payoff distrib-
uting organiser of the experiment. In real life, people cooperate not only for eco-
nomic but also for social reasons, provided that they rationally evaluate the effects 
of permanent cooperation, i.e. if they are oriented not towards the outcome of 
a single game, but the process (Elster, 1985). This knowledge is provided, among 
others, by institutional economics which is not taught by mainstream economics. 
The authors of the “prisoner’s dilemma” experimental game took this fact into 
consideration by conducting additional research in the form of a written interview 
on honesty among the students of economics who started a microeconomics 
course run by one of the two lecturers: the mainstream lecturer emphasising games 
in economics and the lecturer with an institutional orientation who limited the 
class content to the presentation of fundamentals of microeconomics. The students 
of the first lecturer showed a greater change in the level of cynicism (comparative-
ly: before and after the course) than the students of the latter lecturer. 
The authors of the discussed experiment emphasised in the analysis of their 
research results that they showed differences in the behaviour of economics stu-
dents and students of non-economic disciplines. The authors could not, however, 
convincingly demonstrate the causative role of teaching economics in the selfish 
behaviour. The comparison of the results of these experiments shows, however, 
that among students of other disciplines, one could observe:  
(1) differences in the risk propensity and ability to apply the reciprocity principle, 
(2) differences in knowledge concerning the field of game theory. 
This indirectly indicates the importance of economic knowledge in the selec-
tion of selfish strategies in the experiments conducted. Due to the artificiality of 
experimental situations, it cannot be said that economic studies influence the de-
velopment of selfish motivations. However, one cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the content of and manner in which economic sciences, especially microeconom-
ics, are taught exert some influence on students’ views on the importance of self-
ish activities in achieving material success.
2
 
3. The image of homo economicus in American textbooks 
on economics 
In order to authenticate the presented hypothesis, the content of American text-
books on economics has been reviewed and analysed. The choice of Ameri-
can textbooks results from the discussed experiments which concerned American 
students. The most popular and widely used, not only in the United States but also 
in Europe, textbooks of Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985), Lipsey et al. (1990), 
Baumol and Blinder (1988), Varian (1995), Laidler (1981), Kamerschen et al. 
  
                                                          
2 For more information, cf. Etzioni (2015). 
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(1989) and Begg et al. (1993) have been chosen. These are textbooks presenting 
the standard approach to the object of economics and its methods of analysis along 
with the standard assumptions about homo economicus. 
The standard approach to the object of economic research has been shaped by 
the famous essay by Robbins of 1932, who presented economics as the sci-
ence which studies “human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce 
means which have alternative uses.” 
In the examined textbooks, the central place is occupied by the description of 
limited resources and the need to make choices about their use. For example, 
Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985) state that: 
Economics is the study of how men and society end up choosing, with or with-
out the use of money, to employ scarce productive resources which could have 
alternative uses, to produce various commodities and distribute them for con-
sumption, now or in the future, among various people and groups in society. 
Kamerschen et al. (1989, p. 7) define economics in a similar manner, as 
the study of: 
how people cope with scarcity—the pressing problem how to allocate their lim-
ited resources among their competing wants to satisfy as many of those wants as 
possible. 
Lipsey et al. (1990, p. 4) succinctly inform that: 
economics is the study of the use of scarce resources to satisfy unlimited human 
wants. 
The adoption of Robbins’ concept leads to the situation when the basic eco-
nomic problem that homo economicus solves results from an insurmountable scar-
city of resources. It would be difficult to deny that at a given time and under cer-
tain conditions people struggle with a scarcity of resources, however, ignoring 
human entrepreneurial spirit, inventiveness and desire to improve one’s lot in life 
makes a depressing impression. In the definitions presented, economics seems to 
be a zero-sum game. The problem “what are the reasons for the wealth of na-
tions?” posed by Smith has disappeared. In its place, the question arose as to how 
homo economicus makes choices among available options. 
Making choices is the crux of deliberately undertaken economic activity. 
Robbins (1932, p. 95) assumed that the goals were given and resulted from peo-
ple’s mixed motivations: 
our economic subjects can be pure egoists, pure altruists, pure ascetics, pure sen-
sualists or—what is much more likely—mixed bundles of all these impulses. 
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It should be assumed, therefore, that homo economicus is capable of rational 
choices and that economics is the rational choice theory. However, the assump-
tion of rationality is explicitly absent from the textbooks examined, with the ex-
ception of the textbook by Baumol and Blinder (1988, p. 36) where one can read 
that: 
a rational decision is a decision that best serves the purpose of the decision-
maker, no matter what the purpose is. The goals may be related to the desire of 
companies to maximise their profits, the government’s desire to maximise the 
well-being of its citizens or to maximise the government’s military might. 
The term “rational” cannot be an expression of approval or disapproval of any 
purpose. 
The quoted fragment clearly informs why rationality was not included in the 
textbook concepts of choices made by homo economicus. Such a concept should 
be free from all judgments and assessments, from the so-called value judgements. 
Standard economics, as the choice theory free from values, i.e. as a positive sci-
ence, deals—as Begg et al. (1993, p. 43)—say with “objective or scientific expla-
nations of how the economy works”. 
Since the publication of Robbins, mainstream economists have aimed to 
eliminate psychological or philosophical assumptions about human aspirations and 
the structure of human intentions and motives for action. The image of homo eco-
nomicus has departed from the real “baker, butcher, brewer” who, in order to act 
in their self-interest, serve other people and are embedded in their social environ-
ment: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address our-
selves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our 
own necessities but of their advantage. (Smith, 1954, p. 14) 
The concept of self-interest, which is a strong driving factor behind the moti-
vation for human actions, freed by market exchange, is not generally discussed in 
American textbooks on economics. The following problems, which are constantly 
present in research and which have different answers, are also omitted: 
(1) the problem of unintentional effects of intentional actions of homo eco-
nomicus, 
(2) the problem of conflicts between interests of individuals or groups of people, 
(3) the problem of limited self-interest and mixed motivations. 
In this situation, only Begg et al. (1993, pp. 28–29) speak of these issues: 
Economics explains the process of allocating scarce resources between various 
competing uses [...]. This does not mean that economics does not deal with peo-
ple as individuals. It also contains elements of the humanities. This is unavoida-
ble, as only when human behavior can be studied and understood, economists 
are able to focus their research on the right issues. 
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Mainstream economists, however, have focused on “proper problems”, with-
out seeking to explain human actions. This is seen, firstly, in abandoning the is-
sue of rationality in the choice theory.
3
 Secondly, this is evidenced by the aspira-
tions of Hicks, Samuelson, Arrow and Debreu to build the choice theory in which 
the assumptions about homo economicus take the form of axioms, as in mathemat-
ics, related to the rationality of choices (Rosenberg, 1992). The presentation of the 
consumer choice theory in the examined textbooks consists in replacing the pur-
posefulness of choices with the ability to organise baskets of goods based on indi-
vidual preferences. Baumol and Blinder (1988, p. 474) say: 
Consumers will select the most desired combination of goods obtainable for 
their money [...]. 
Begg et al. (1993, pp. 141–144) present a similar view: 
the consumer arranges baskets of goods, which reveals the preference for some 
baskets, and then chooses from among the available baskets the one that pro-
vides maximum utility. 
A high level of skills related to building a cohesive set of preferences that are 
complete, transitive, reflexive and continuous is attributed to the consumer arrang-
ing baskets of goods. It seems that these preferences are neutral. However, a thor-
ough analysis reveals hidden assumptions about the Archimedean nature of pref-
erences and utility maximisation. The first characteristic is related to the assertion 
that: 
Consumers obtain the greatest utility from their money by choosing combina-
tions of goods whose marginal rate of substitution equals the ratio of their prices. 
(Baumol and Blinder, 1988, p. 474) 
This means that the loss of a certain amount of a given good in the basket can 
be compensated by increasing the amount of another good. All preferences are 
therefore reducible; they do not have a hierarchical structure. Different intentions 
and desires are of equal importance to man, they are reduced to a common denom-
inator, the so-called utility. 
Utility is defined in the analysed textbooks as neutrally as possible, as satis-
faction or happiness derived from consumption. Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985, 
pp. 411–412) present it as follows: 
utility is an abstract concept used in economics to denote the subjective pleasure, 
usefulness, or satisfaction derived from consuming goods [...]. Utility is a simple 
and analytical construct used to explain how rational consumers allocate their 
limited income among goods that give them satisfaction or utility. 
                                                          
3 The exception is the theory of rational expectations which has received many critical reviews.  
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This quote shows an attempt to create the choice theory free from psycholog-
ical or philosophical assumptions about man. To this end, it has been necessary to 
introduce procedural rationality, without assumptions about intentionality, voli-
tionality and institutionality of human actions. Then, it can be formally argued that 
the rational action procedure replaces the optimisation goal. However, most econ-
omists choose individual utility and assume its maximisation. Maximising means 
that the consumer prefers more rather than less: 
The consumer wishes to do as well as he can for himself, to select that consump-
tion pattern out of those available to him that will yield the highest possible level 
of satisfaction—he wishes to maximize his utility. (Laidler, 1981, p. 15) 
The consumer seeks to maximize his utility. (Kamerschen, McKenzie, Nard-
inelli, 1989, p. 152) 
In standard economics, it is widely accepted that consumers maximise utility 
because they prefer to consume more rather than less. Let us assume that this is 
just a convenient concept, useful for explaining choices. It is, however, associated 
with two possibilities: 
1) one adopts a utilitarian concept of searching for the truth due to its utility for 
most people. If market research reveals preferences for more rather than 
less, then these revealed preferences are useful for explaining choices; 
2) preferences are selfish because a given person’s utility depends on this 
person’s consumption and not the consumption of other people. The con-
cept of utility taking into account satisfaction derived from consuming 
purchased and donated goods by other people does not appear in the ana-
lysed textbooks. At most, it is sometimes claimed that people are isolated 
and, therefore, their preferences are neutral. 
The attempt to neutralise economics by separating it from value has been nei-
ther successful nor consistently taught in the analysed textbooks. Therefore, the 
reference to hedonism made by Edgeworth and Jevons cannot be accidental. 
The presentation of the concept of economics and its basic assumptions about 
homo economicus results in a different picture from the one intended by the au-
thors of the textbooks studied. Since the publication in 1871 of Theory of Political 
Economy by Jevons, who wrote that “to maximize pleasure is the problem of eco-
nomics” and that the market theory is “the mechanics of utility and self-interest” 
(1871, p. 46), there has been no major change in this respect. According to Begg, 
Dornbusch and Fischer, economic activity is so simple that “even rats can do it” 
(1993, p. 157). The authors thus referred to an experiment showing that a white rat 
had the ability to choose between cocktail and beer based on the difference in 
price. 
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4. Critical reflections 
In the light of the presented “textbook” image of homo economicus who always 
prefers more rather than less, seeks to maximise his own utility and is focused on 
ordering his own preferences, it can be concluded that the results of the discussed 
experiments show adequate knowledge on the part of economics students. It is, 
however, worth considering the duties of a microeconomics lecturer, who, as 
demonstrated by the last of the discussed experiments, can play an important role. 
This role depends on his or her knowledge of debates concerning the object of 
economics and its methods of analysis, especially discussions that deal with the 
explanation of economic activity. The authors of the analysed textbooks often 
draw the reader’s attention to explanation, while Samuelson’s concept of econom-
ics as a descriptive science is the most widespread. The competing axiomatic 
approach to economics as the choice theory is incorporated into the description of 
revealed preferences. If a given lecturer does not have in-depth knowledge about 
various concepts of explanation, i.e. the lecturer does not distinguish such con-
cepts and separate them from the description, it results in an incoherent lecture 
from which emerges the image of not really a man and not really a rat making 
choices for the sake of sensual pleasure. 
In addition to utility and preferences, the analysed textbooks describe desires, 
wants and needs. These concepts are not explained, though they are very im-
portant. The lack of definition is replaced by the assumption that needs, tastes, and 
preferences are given. This is the so-called taste model proposed by Hume (1963, 
Vol. III, Section I). It is a model that assumes that people build their lives by striv-
ing to fulfil their desires which are subjective and emotional. People, therefore, 
think that a life of value is the kind of life they want. By accepting that man is 
a biological and psychological being, it can be argued that desires are permanent 
and given. 
The taste model is built on the clear distinction between facts and values 
called Hume’s guillotine. The distinction between facts/values is also accompanied 
by oppositions between is/should, reason/feeling and understanding/reacting. 
Therefore, the taste model does not attribute the property of rationality to individ-
ual desires and tendencies. What we want is valuable subjectively and emotional-
ly. People strive to fulfil their desires because they want what is good for them 
according to what they imagine and feel is good. 
If we analyse the consumer choice theory in the light of the taste model, then 
some inconsistencies that I drew attention to in the third part of the paper are clari-
fied. Maintaining rationality as procedural rationality is a formal issue, subjective 
preferences, however, represented by the utility function, are central. Preferences 
are subjective, just as utility derived from consumption is subjective. Choices, 
therefore, are not rational in the substantial sense, but they are an expression of 
personal desires and anticipated satisfaction resulting from fulfilling one’s prefer-
ences. The disappearance of the concept of self-interest is also explained, as  
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self-interest choices are rational. A rational egoist, acting in his own interest, will 
not always maximise his actual desires; he may decide that it is in his interest to 
abandon certain aspirations. 
The choice of subjectivism by standard economics calls for justification. 
Scanlon (1975, pp. 655–669) provided two arguments: 
(1) the subjective criterion of economic choices attributes the highest im-
portance to the sovereignty of individual tastes which can be identified by 
means of preferences; 
(2) the subjective criterion is oriented towards the results of economic activity 
that correspond to the diversity of needs. 
In economics textbooks, the first argument is emphasised as the assumption of 
consumer sovereignty. For example, Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985, p. 44) say: 
The economy is ultimately ruled by two monarchs: consumers and technology. 
Consumers direct by their innate or learned tastes, as expressed in their dollar 
votes [...]. 
This quote shows the application of the taste model in a rather unsophisticat-
ed manner since actual, autonomous desires have been replaced by “innate or 
learned tastes,” and their fulfilment depends on technology. At present, it is even 
claimed that the argument of consumer sovereignty is empty as consumers do not 
have the knowledge and information enabling them to make choices in the world 
of high technology (Sirgy & Chenting, 2000). The idea of consumer sovereignty 
requires full rationality. The choice theory, however, proves that the consumer can 
only choose between two substitutable goods. 
The second argument for subjectivity has been abandoned in standard eco-
nomics. Certain needs, such as health and sustenance, belong to the sphere of 
facts, and in the light of the presented distinctions can be considered as objective 
and rationally pursued. This view of needs is considered to be at risk of paternal-
ism. However, satisfying actual, and therefore subjective, desires guarantees con-
sumer sovereignty (Griffin, 1998, p. 36). 
Various objections are raised against the taste model. In the extreme case, it 
is rejected in favour of the perception model, which gives precedence to value 
judgment: first, we assess something as valuable, and then we strive to achieve 
what is valuable. In this approach, reason and reflection prevail over the objective 
value of a given object. Revealed values exist independently of subjective desires. 
Their fulfilment provides deep satisfaction resulting from the understanding of 
important aspects of reality. 
The adoption of the perception model could seriously undermine the axiolog-
ical foundation of the market economy—negative freedom, as there is a danger of 
replacing individual, free choices with the arbitrary imposition of what should be 
chosen as objectively valuable. Although basic needs exist, their satisfaction can 
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be varied, and it can change according to a subjective scale. Therefore, objections 
against the taste model generally do not lead to providing evidence that it needs to 
be rejected. 
Firstly, it is claimed that the subjective choice criterion is satisfactory with 
regard to an ordering of certain baskets of goods, but it is not sufficiently sensitive 
to the diversity of needs. Some needs are particularly urgent and important, but 
preferences do not form a hierarchy. Scanlon (1975) proposes the introduction of 
the so-called urgency, expressing man’s general concern about satisfying basic 
needs, into the taste model. Sen (1981), however, thinks that a hierarchical order-
ing of preferences requires meta-preferences. Frankfurt (1971) proposed a multi-
level concept of personality. First-order desires result from the biological nature of 
man, but also from unreflectiveness, giving into impulses, influences and pressure. 
Frankfurt calls the man who exhibits only desires of the first order “a wanton”. 
“His desires move him to do certain things, without its being true of him either 
that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other 
desires” (1971, p. 11). Whereas desires of the second order make a man a person. 
A person makes decisions based on reflection on first-order desires and how to 
fulfil them to achieve their own preferences and goals. 
In the light of these reservations, the taste model can be used for simple 
choices which are about biological desires and which even a rat can make. 
Secondly, it is said that some desires are peripheral, and their fulfilment does 
not affect individual well-being. While making choices, a man should not suc-
cumb to impulses or rely on fate but should have knowledge about the world and 
be deeply aware which aspects of reality he considers as valuable. Therefore, 
desires and preferences are not rejected, but the condition is imposed that they 
should be rational (Broome, 1991; Griffin, 1988). 
Desire is not blind; reason is not inert. (Griffin, 1988, p. 55) 
Thirdly, the consumer choice theory based on the taste model faces the criti-
cism related to reactivity. Man changes the order of his preferences in response to 
changing income and market prices. The possibility that man changes his desires 
and tastes under the influence of other than economic factors is not accepted. 
However, such an option cannot be rejected. Human nature is complex, prone to 
self-evaluation and reflection. Its non-biological component is a factor in the au-
tonomous change of desires and tastes, the reason for actions focused not on the 
result itself, but on the process, on the route to achievement (Hirschman, 1985; 
Elster, 1985). 
The presented reservations allow us to understand the application of the taste 
model in economics and its limitations. There is usually no discussion concerning 
these reservations in American economics textbooks. Only Begg et al. (1993, 
p. 77) point out that: 
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people are not beings as simple as economists assume. Prices, incomes and prof-
its are not the main determinants of our behavior [...] Economics places empha-
sis on phenomena caused by economic stimuli. 
This reservation, however, does not change the general message conveyed by 
this particular textbook and other American economics textbooks. It was rightly 
pointed out by Sulejewicz (2002, p. 9) that “neoclassical economics [...] does not 
see the context in which knowledge is created.” 
5. Conclusions 
Experimental methods in social sciences cannot be considered as a valuable 
source of scientific information. They should be combined with other research 
methods and used systematically among pupils and students as well as among 
people working in various economic professions. My observations as a lecturer of 
microeconomics in the first year of studies and business ethics in the fifth year 
indicate the destructive impact of a decline in the level of cognitive requirements 
resulting from the prevalence of empirical and “manipulative,” as students call 
them, disciplines. A massive attendance at university and the resulting lack of 
relations with peers and professors also have an adverse effect. 
These observations have been confirmed over the subsequent years of my di-
dactic work. In addition, I have observed a lack of response of students involved 
in the business activity to ethical arguments. In the course of MBA studies, I cov-
ered books of Sandel: Justice (2009) and What Money Can’t Buy (2012). In their 
essays, students disagreed with the arguments presented by Sandel. They repeated-
ly stated that in Poland, as in the United States of America, expanding the market 
boundaries to encompass such “goods” as friendship, sterilisation, or egg cells 
could be considered as assistance given to another person and also that there 
would always be someone who would choose such forms of making money. Opin-
ions that relativised individual choices were widespread. The students who were 
the authors of those essays knew the economic reality and I think that relativisa-
tion of moral aspects of business facilitated their reconciliation of problematic 
phenomena over which they had no control over. 
Regardless of characteristics of economic studies in Poland, I would argue 
that the dominance of American economics textbooks requires from a lecturer in-
depth knowledge of history of economic theory, political and moral philosophy as 
well as the methodology of economics. Such knowledge is indispensable so that 
neoclassical economics we teach could be presented as a science which: 
(1) studies human actions in the field of economic activity, and thus describes 
and explains some aspects of multifaceted human activity; 
(2) deals with actions, not behaviours; as in the latter case, there is a far-
reaching simplification of the studied phenomena which reduces them to 
the relationship between the stimulus and the response; 
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(3) arises in the context of pluralistic psychological and philosophical concepts 
about human nature; the choice of specific concepts, therefore, requires jus-
tification; 
(4) teleologically explains economic activity as result-oriented actions that sat-
isfy only some goals found in the hierarchically complex structure of hu-
man goals.  
Wicksteed wrote in 1910 that: 
We may either ignore motives altogether or may recognise all motives that are at 
work, according to the aspect of the matter with which we are concerned at the 
moment; but in no case may we pick and choose between the motives we will 
and the motives we will not recognise as affecting economic conditions. (p. 162) 
In the first case, microeconomics would become primitive behaviourism, and 
the person making market choices would not differ from a rat. A small step would 
separate such microeconomics from social engineering and the resulting “manipu-
lative disciplines” that would create the grounds for intellectual contempt for man. 
In the latter case, the concept of homo economicus in microeconomics and ways of 
explaining economic activity should be thoroughly reconsidered. The development 
of institutional economics, which attempts to explain economic activity in a social 
context, brings hope in this respect. 
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